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Discussion After the Speeches of Joseph P. Griffin,
Warren Grover and David G. Gill

QUESTION, ProfessorKing: I had a question for Joe Griffin. You
mentioned the Antitrust Guide of 1977, and the plans for revision. What
is the posture of a business in terms of following the Antitrust Guide of
1977, and of looking at the anticipated Guide of the year 2000, if it comes
out at that time. What is the current status of the Guide?
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: There are now on the record a number of
speeches by Charles Rule and some other people outlining basically what
they intend the Guide to do. Let me try to summarize those quickly for
you.
The format will remain basically the same: an opening statement of
principles and policy, followed by a number of hypothetical examples
with analysises of how those examples would be analyzed. The change
will be in the substance, most starkly in the licensing area. Basically,
what you can do is every place where there is a "not" in the current
guide, just cross it out. Those of you who follow antitrust, remember
there used to be something called "the nine no-nos" of patent licensing.
They are all now "yes-yeses."
That whole area has been turned on its head by the administration.
Charles Rule has given a number of speeches specifically repudiating the
nine no-nos and saying that now they are all wonderful practices and we
want to encourage them.
The other areas that are going to see the most dramatic changes are
the vertical areas. You may remember there is already in existence vertical guidelines about things like distribution arrangements and vertical
restraints, and the international guide will be written to take account of
those.
The other two areas likely to see dramatic changes are joint ventures
and mergers. There will be some change in the jurisdiction area. Basically, they are going to try to create a dichotomy between a government
brought-suit and a private suit, which I find to be outrageous. It flies
directly in the face of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. When you
think about it, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a piece of
legislation now ten years old, the courts have the final word on whether a
sovereign is immune or not, even if it is the U.S. Government that is the
plaintiff. In the face of that, for the Justice Department to say that if
they bring a suit they cannot be challenged as to whether or not the
sovereign should be sued on the basis of comity or on the basis of sovereign compulsion, I find to be a breach of the law.
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On what will happen with politics, the problem is not whether or
not the Guide will be changed after the 1988 election. The problem is
whether or not it will become irrevelant because trade policy will simply
further submerge antitrust policy, and to the extent that there is an inconsistency, the trend clearly seems to be to protect competitors and
markets, not to protect competition. So my concern is not that the Guide
itself will be rewritten once again, but that in a year or two it will not
make any difference at all what the Guide says.
QUESTION, Mr.Stayin: Along that same line I wanted to ask you,
the Export Trading Company Act has been pushed very, very aggressively by the Export Trading Company Office in the Commerce Department. They are trying to get all the trade associations in Washington to
have their members to adopt this and try to use this as a very effective
vehicle for competing.
What about trade associations meeting and discussing what they do
in foreign markets? For example, you have a panel of members who
discuss what they pay their distributors in Korea or in France, or they
might choose some other type of activity that, if they were to discuss
what they pay their distributors in the United States, and get involved in
vertical restraints, they would be subject to antitrust enforcement. What
will happen under our current regime?
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: I will answer the question, but let me begin
by making a point of philosophy.
It is my belief, based on being a battle-scared veteran of Washington, that any time you ask the Government to tell you something in writing you will get the most conservative, cautious answer possible. I
submit that as simply a truism.
Therefore, I ask why are you asking the Commerce and Justice Departments to give you something in writing? The law is actually pretty
clear that if you meet in the United States and have trade association
discussions that concern only conduct outside of the United States that
affects only non-Americans, there is no jurisdiction over that conduct in
the first place, and there is no need for a certificate of immunity. The
problem is obviously one of classic trade association, a problem of how
do you prove what you discussed? There are, of course, remedies such as
having outside witnesses there. Another problem is if you look at who
we are using as the export trading company vehicle, without trying to be
too pejorative about it, they are small, unsophisticated operations. There
is not a single large multinational that has applied as an export trading
company. Why is that?
I submit that it is because they know the problem with conservative
answers from Washington, they think they have competent counsel or
can obtain it and see no need to comply with the notice requirements
which simply give competitors, not necessarily U.S. competitors, but foreign competitors, notice of what they intend to do. Why would any intel-
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ligent businessperson want to do that? Consequently, I am not a fan of
the export trading company legislation and I think the statistics that I
quoted earlier tend to bear it out.
For example, they were talking about the creation of 600,000 new
jobs when that act was passed. When I called the other day to get the
statistics, they said they were still compiling that data, they were not
sure. When I said, "Is it less than ten?" the fellow said, "I can't answer."
QUESTION, Professor King: I want to ask David Gill a question.
We have seen that the EC has gone a step further than the United States
in terms of antitrust progress, or adventure, if you want to describe it by
another name.
I wondered if the EC antitrust rules adversely affect EC competitors
of U.S. and Canadian firms in terms of what has been applied under the
Rome Treaty and also the regulations that have been issued by the
commission?
ANSWER, Mr. Gill: That is a difficult question to answer, because
the EC laws also stop at the water edge. They really pertain to relations
among the EC countries. One thing that is clear is that the EC has been
steadily developing over the past fifteen years a much more detailed array
of antitrust laws than had previously been the case. It is going to be very
interesting to see what happens in developing this new proposed regulation on controlling mergers.
That does not answer your question, I know, but I think the real
fact is that EC companies, similar to the U.S. companies and to Canadian companies, are faced with a real and very well enforced set of antitrust regulations.
COMMENT, Mr. Cunningham: I would like to offer a brief
vignette in commenting on Warren Grover's dicussion of the extent to
which the United States has a zeal for extraterritoriality.
Warren mentioned a Canadian company that engaged for years in
defrauding American shareholders with gold mines in Honduras. I was
the U.S. counsel for those defrauded U.S. shareholders, and at one point
the Canadian judge sustained the holding of a shareholders' meeting of
that Canadian company despite the fact that it did not comply with U.S.
proxy rules. It was sustained it on the ground that it was a Canadian
company in full compliance with Canadian law. I was treated shortly
thereafter to a meeting with the Federal Trade Commission chief of enforcement and the Federal Communications Commission general counsel
who engaged in an hour's learned discussion in areas, in which they might
indict the Canadian judge, thereby, enforcing Canadian law. So to the
extent that you think that there is a clash of cultures here you may not
even appreciate the full scope of it.
QUESTION, Mr. Salembier: I was very interested to hear the statement from Joe Griffin regarding the increasing prevalence in trade policy
over antitrust concerns in the United States. However, I have not heard
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much today of what I always thought was the clearest extension of antitrust concerns throughout the national trade agreements, namely antidumping.
First, do you see any indication for U.S. anti-dumping policy from
the trends that you have describe in the theory of antitrust? My second
question is for Mr. Gill. Do you see, given the inability of the two countries come to an agreement in the FTA negotiations on anti-dumping
matters, any connection between what you have described as a very rosy
picture for cooperation of the antitrust area?
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: As they say, I am so glad you asked that
question. I was at a meeting about two weeks ago with Judge Ginsburg.
You may remember that he had been a head of the Antitrust Division
before he became a judge. We were having a luncheon and the issue that
you raised about anti-dumping and antitrust came up. He offered the
following analysis, which he was at pains to say was not only his, but also
the Chicago school of analysis, which is, if other people want to dump
products in the United States, that should be encouraged. That if other
countries want to subsidize low prices to American consumers not only
should we not prevent that, we should encourage it because it is a gift to
American consumers. When we asked about jobs and all the standard
arguments, his reply was, as the Chicago school reply is to everything,
"In the long run the market will sort that out."
On the policy side, what I was trying to get at was that in the 1950s
and 1960s there was an American preoccupation with competition in the
United States, and keeping that competition fair and free and open. Now
the preoccupation is "us against the rest of the world," "how do we keep
the playing field level," and "how do we keep international trade fair?"
One of the proposals of how to deal with that phenomena is to make
antitrust a weapon in the fight against unfair international trade. Why
do not we bring conspiracy cases and other kinds of cases against foreigners who are dumping, or who are engaging in subsidiaries?
There is a technical problem on the antitrust side; consumer welfare
is going up because they are paying a lower price. I think my point is,
the basis of the policy debate has shifted. If you listen to the candidates
in the presidential election, they are all on the same track about making
international trade free and fair. Theoretically, we are going to have
level playing fields and we are going to use whatever weapons we have at
our disposal. No candidate is saying, "and by the way, I will, as one of
my platforms planks, make U.S. competitors in the United States follow
the same rules."
COMMENT, Mr. Cunningham: I am going to talk about the technical side of this issue this evening. I will say one thing, I think the
United States has moved from the position of the 1960s in the way we
were concerned about the U.S. market and consumers toward the position that most other developed countries take, in which we are concerned
more about retaining production in this country.
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COMMENT, Mr. Gill: On the second question I think that perhaps
I should refer this to Richard Cunningham as well. I would say that it is
going to be a lot easier to settle antitrust differences between the two
countries, in my estimation, than to settle anti-dumping or trade matters.
The trade matters are always much more closely thought out as involving real dollars and some very emotional issues as well as real economic
issues. What is very interesting to me, though, is that the FTA does
contain this provision for dispute settlement, establishing bi-national
panels to attempt to resolve differences in the anti-dumping and countervailing duty. That is a tremendous achievement even though it does, in
effect, mask an inability to put down a final resolution of that dispute.
QUESTION, Mr. Fried: This is a follow-up question on the same
subject and I hope it does not get into tonight's subject matter. A free
trade area should, insofar as possible, create a single market. The borders should be irrevelant for trading purposes and market principles
should prevail.
Anti-dumping, which is in the United States identified as unfair
trade, covers practices which are both anti-competitive and technically
not anti-competitive. Technically, getting rid of products at the end the
season, for example, a winter sweater in April, comes within dumping.
Competition law would not define that as unfair.
Thus the theory would go, would it not make sense in a free trade
area not to have dumping statutes at all, but rather only to use price
discrimination and predatory pricing remedies? Your comments seem to
suggest the reverse, that the availability, the quickness, the cheapness and
petitioner-oriented trade statutes have been used instead of antitrust laws
to harass or to pursue foreign competition.
If you take away the trade remedy, it will lead to an increase in the
use of price discrimination and predatory pricing remedies, not to protect
true competition, but once again, to harass the foreign competitor.
ANSWER, Mr. Griffin: I think that is right. My fear is that we are
not going to get rid of the dumping remedy and we are going to expand
the use of antitrust suits. I use as my precedent for this the Japanese
television cases.
If you remember in the 1960s, the U.S. industry, still pretty large
and viable, lost basically a major counterattack on all fronts. They filed a
whole series of every different kind of trade remedy proceeding of which
they could think. At the same time, they launched a massive antitrust
conspiracy case and a criminal dumping case, the remnants of which
ended up in the Supreme Court in the Zenith cases eighteen years later.
My point is that one offshoot of the Free Trade Agreement may be
that the markets are going to open up, the boundaries are going to become less relevant, and those American industries that feel threatened
are going to put on tremendous pressure to use all available remedies.
That was one reason why those who are interested in either modifying or
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eliminating dumping in this situation will not succeed and at the same
time the antitrust remedies will be brought into play because of the private treble damage action, even in situations where the American Government does not feel that it would be appropriate.
COMMENT, Mr. Fried: The reason that I ask is because the Free
Trade Agreement permits both countries, during a five year period starting January 1989, to negotiate a replacement regime through subsidiaries
in a dumping remedy.
One option that is widely reported publicly that had been looked at
in the negotiations was the possibility of whether or not the competition
laws, rather than the dumping laws, were to deal with private pricing
practices. Subsidies and countervailing duties are a different question.
But, in addition to the current dispute settlement issue, there is the possibility of some substantive changes in rules applicable to North American
trade.
COMMENT, Professor King: We have had a great session. I want
to thank, on behalf of all of us, Joe Griffin, Warren Grover, and David
Gill.

